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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE BEETLE 
INTHEBOXt 
WENDY CoLLINs PERDuE* 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it 
a "beetle." No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone 
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.-
H ere it would be quite possible for everyone to have something 
different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing con-
stantly changing.-But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in 
these people's language?-If so it would not be used as the name 
of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-
game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be 
empty. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has 
been particularly interested in personal jurisdiction questions. 2 De-
t Copyright© 1991 Wendy Collins Perdue. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Wellesley Col-
lege, 1975; J.D., Duke University, 1978. I would like to thank Mark Tushnet, Wendy Williams 
and the participants at the Georgetown Faculty Research Seminar for their helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
1 L. WriTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 293 (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. 3d 
ed. 1958). 
2 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, llO S. Ct. 2105 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
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spite its apparent interest in the subject, the Court has been unable 
to develop a coherent doctrine. The result has been that every few 
years, the Court's description of personal jurisdiction is inconsistent 
with its recent prior precedent. 
In 1980 in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woods-on, the Supreme 
Court described personal jurisdiction as "an instrument of interstate 
federalism."3 Two years later in Insurance Corporation of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court back-pedaled and ex-
plained that personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judi-
cial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of indi-
vidual liberty."4 Then, in 1985 in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, the 
Court explained that the purpose of personal jurisdiction is "to 
protect a defendant from the travail of defending in a distant 
forum."5 Three years later in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, the Court 
stated that personal jurisdiction does not entail a right to be pro-
tected from the burdens of trial, but entails only a right not to be 
"subject to the binding judgments" of particular places. 6 · 
The Court's struggle in the area of personal jurisdiction has 
reached the point that the Court is now having difficulty generating 
majority opinions. In its two most recent personal jurisdiction cases, 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court7 and Burnham v. Superior 
Court8 the Court was unanimous in its conclusion, but deeply frag-
mented in its rationale. 
The reason for the Court's difficulty in this area appears to be 
that personal jurisdiction is really a solution in search of a problem. 
Although the Court has thought "the problem" to be sufficiently 
important to warrant its hearing thirteen personal jurisdiction cases 
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In january 1991, the Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in yet another personal jurisdiction case, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377 
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, ll1 S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
3 444 u.s. 286, 294 (1980). 
4 456 u.s. 694, 702 (1982). 
5 472 u.s. 797, 807 (1985). 
6 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988). Van Cauwenberghe highlights a collateral but revealing issue 
involving personal jurisdiction-the issue of whether a refusal to dismiss a case for lack of 
jurisdiction is immediately appealable in federal court. Id. at 518-19. If personal jurisdiction 
is a kind of personal immunity that protects citizens from the processes of unrelated sover-
eigns or prevents the undue burdens of litigation in distant fora, this interest could not be 
vindicated except by allowing an immediate appeal. Nonetheless, in Van Cauwenberght!, the 
Court suggested almost offhandedly that immediate appeals would not be allowed in such 
cases. See id. at 526-27. 
7 480 u.s. 102 (1987). 
8 llO S. Ct. 2105 (1990). 
May 1991] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 531 
in the past fourteen years, it has never explicitly defined the prob-
lem. To use the metaphor of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Court seems 
to assume that we all know the characteristics of the beetle in the 
box of personal jurisdiction. Yet, because the Court has never ac-
tually described the "beetle," it seems subject to infinite change. 
The plurality opinions in the recent Burnham case highlight this 
problem. In Burnham, the Court unanimously upheld the constitu-
tionality of "transient" jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction based solely 
on the fact that the defendant was served with process while present 
in the forum state. 9 Justices Brennan and Scalia, each writing for 
separate pluralities, agreed that personal jurisdiction is controlled 
by "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."10 Rather 
than defining these notions, however, they focused on the extent to 
which these notions are subject to change. 11 
Justice Brennan insisted that the relevant fairness principles 
evolve over time.12 Yet, he also concluded that transient jurisdiction 
is still valid. 13 It is unclear whether Justice Brennan believes the 
principles of fairness that he used to analyze transient jurisdiction 
are newly evolved ones that happen to yield the same result as the 
old principles, or whether he believes that, although the principles 
generally evolve, the principles relevant to this case have not 
changed. 
Justice Scalia's opinion is troubling for a different reason. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's approach would allow the 
Court to compel states to change long-established practices based 
on "no authority other than individual Justices' perceptions of fair-
ness."14 In order to prevent this standardless intrusion into state 
autonomy, Justice Scalia argued that the Court must rely on "tra-
dition," namely, what was accepted practice in 1868 at the time of 
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 15 Yet, Justice Scalia's 
opinion itself acknowledges that within a few decades of 1868, the 
Court began expanding jurisdiction beyond its "traditional" limits. 16 
9 Id. at 2119 (Scalia,J.); id. at 2119-20 (White,]., concurring); id. at 2126 (Brennan,]., 
concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
10 See id. at 2114 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
11 Thus, Burnham is largely a continuation of the Supreme Court's debate concerning 
the proper methodology to be used in evaluating substantive due process claims. See, e.g., 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341-46 (1989). 
12 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-22 (Brennan,]., concurring). 
13 Id. at 2124-26. 
HId. at 2117-19 (Scalia,].). 
15 Jd.at2111. 
1s Id. at 2113-15. 
532 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:529 
Thus, according to Justice Scalia's own opinion, it seems that in the 
area of personal jurisdiction it is not traditional to limit personal 
jurisdiction to its traditional limits. 17 
Ultimately, the dialogue between Justices Brennan and Scalia 
does little to illuminate personal jurisdiction. To return to the met-
aphor of the beetle in the box, Justice Brennan has looked in his 
box and announced that his personal jurisdiction beetle is evolving, 
though the particular part of the beetle in question has not changed. 
Justice Scalia has looked in his box and announced that his beetle 
cannot change, though he notes that another part of the beetle, not 
relevant to this case, has changed in the past. 
Until we finally identify the underlying problem for which 
personal jurisdiction is the solution, the doctrinal muddle will per-
sist. Yet, it is not obvious what problem personal jurisdiction solves. 
One might argue that personal jurisdiction is simply a guaranty of 
immunity from the inconvenience of distant litigation. 18 The doc-
17 As Justice Scalia acknowledges, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), presents a 
particularly strong counterargument to his assertion that the relevant test is tradition. In 
Shaffer, the Court struck down quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, a type of jurisdiction that had 
historically been permitted in the United States. Id. at 216-17. In order to reconcile Shaffer 
with his analysis, Justice Scalia suggested that the practice at issue in that case was "engaged 
in by only a very small minority of the States," 110 S. Ct. at 2116 (footnote omitted), noting 
that the case involved attachment of stock in Delaware and Delaware was "the only State that 
treated the place of incorporation as the situs of corporate stock when both the owner and 
custodian were elsewhere." I d. at 2116 n.4. This characterization of the holding in Shaffer is 
consistent with Justice Scalia's argument in Michael H. that in looking to tradition "[w]e refer 
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, 
the asserted right can be identified." 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6. 
Justice Scalia's attempt to limit Shaffer in this way is troubling for several reasons. First, 
although Delaware may have been unique in its treatment of stock, it cannot be said that 
there was a traditional right to be free from state exercises of power on this basis. Instead, 
it seems more accurate to say that there was simply no tradition in this specific area. Thus, 
under Justice Scalia's own methodology it is necessary to consult the next more general level 
of tradition. See id. A logical next level of generality would be to inquire whether there is a 
traditional right to be free from jurisdiction based on the presence of intangible property. 
At this level of generality, there is a tradition, that is, jurisdiction was traditionally permitted 
on this basis. Maybe there is some interim level of generality that explains Shaffer's result, 
but Justice Scalia does not identify it. 
A less theoretical objection to Scalia's characterization of Shaffer is that he seems to be 
arguing that Shaffer did not invalidate all or even most assertions of quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion-it only invalidated the attempt to get jurisdiction based on the fictitious presence of 
stock. This extraordinarily narrow reading of Shaffer is at odds with the language of the case 
itself which did not discuss the situs of intangibles and drew no distinction between suits 
concerned by the seizure of intangible versus tangible property. See Lowenfeld, In Search of 
the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 102, 110-15 (1978). 
18 See Lewis, Tile "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-
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trine that has developed, however, does not focus on such a guar-
anty.19 Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that per-
sonal jurisdiction serves some other purpose.20 Limitations of 
personal jurisdiction could be intended to protect a defendant from 
the bias of states with which she is not affiliated. Again, however, 
the developed doctrine is not addressed to bias.21 Moreover, neither 
inconvenience nor the bias theories explains why we should be more 
concerned with inconvenience and bias suffered by defendants than 
that suffered by plaintiffs. 22 
Some commentators have attempted to describe in some detail 
the problem for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. 23 They 
have suggested two related problems for which personal jurisdiction 
is supposedly the solution. The first of these perceived problems is 
derived from a central concern of political philosophy, that is, when 
may a state legitimately exercise coercive power?24 The second per-
Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 771 (1982); Redish, Due 
Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 
1133-34 (1981); Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: 
Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485, 522-27 (1984). 
19 See Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 
1291, 1303-12 (1983); Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a 
Distance, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1043, 1058-59; Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: 
Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 509-10 (1987); Stein, 
Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 
689, 708 (1987). 
20 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction 
"more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient ... litigation"), quoted in World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Abrams, Power, Convenience, and 
the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1982); Redish, 
supra note 18, at 1117-18, 1137. But see Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue 
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 411,416 (1981) (suggesting that the minimum 
contacts test is a rule of thumb .for estimating convenience and reasonableness); Lewis, The 
Three Deaths of"State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 709 (1983) (same). 
21 There is no reason to believe states would be less biased against a defendant with 
"minimum contacts" than defendants with no contacts with the state. See Gottlieb, supra note 
19, at 1302. 
22 See Perdue, supra note 19, at 517-18. 
23 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 
1980 SuP. CT. REv. 77, 86-87 [hereinafter How Contacts Count]; Brilmayer,Jurisdictional Due 
Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 293, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Political Theory]; 
Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate 
Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 389, 391 (1987) [hereinafter Shaping & Sharing]; Stewart, A 
New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. Cow. L. REv. 5, 19 (1989); Trangsrud, The Federal 
Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 849, 884-85 (1989); Weisburd, 
Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WAsH. U.L.Q. 377, 378 (1985). 
24 See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text. 
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ceived problem reflects commerce clause-related concerns about 
burdening and discriminating against outsiders who are not rep-
resented in the state's political process.25 
Some of the personal jurisdiction cases do in fact suggest that 
these two supposed problems are the ones the Supreme Court is 
attempting to solve. Unfortunately, neither is a satisfactory foun-
dation for personal jurisdiction doctrine. Indeed, the linking of 
personaljurisdiction to these supposed problems has compounded, 
not reduced, doctrinal difficulties. Moreover, proponents of this 
approach have generally relied on theories of political legitimacy 
that are both misleading and troubling. 
This article analyzes and criticizes these two problems suppos-
edly solved by personal jurisdiction. Section I describes the problem 
of politicallegitimacy26 and Section II examines a commerce clause 
analogy as another justification for constitutional limits on state 
adjudicatory authority.27 Section III then examines several alter-
native problems for which personal jurisdiction may be the solu-
tion. 28 These problems are practical ones and reflect the premise 
that personal jurisdiction may be nothing more than what actual 
litigants have always thought it was, namely, a doctrine to limit a 
plaintiff's choices of possible fora. 
l. THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
The United States Supreme Court case of Insurance Corporation 
of Ireland29 contains the clearest articulation of the supposed prob-
lem for which personal jurisdiction doctrine is the solution. In that 
case, the Court rejected earlier suggestions that personal jurisdiction 
was a doctrine designed to preserve federalism.30 The Court ex-
plained that the personal jurisdiction requirement "represents a 
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as 
a matter of individual liberty."31 In a footnote, the Court further 
explained that "[t]he restriction on state sovereign power described 
25 See infra notes 110-63 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 29-109 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 110-63 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 164-227 and accompanying text. 
29 456 u.s. 694 (1982). 
so I d. at 702-03; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-
94 (1980). 
51 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702. 
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in [an earlier case] ... must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause."32 
This description of the relationship between the due process 
clause and personal jurisdiction suggests that personal jurisdiction 
is a substantive due process right.33 Apparently, the defendant's 
liberty is taken when she is subjected to jurisdiction in a forum with 
which she lacks the requisite connection. Yet, the Court has never 
explained why being subject to jurisdiction is a taking of liberty, at 
least where the defendant has had notice and a full opportunity to 
defend. 
Commentators have begun to provide the explanation, arguing 
that personal jurisdiction is a concrete manifestation of the problem 
of political obligation and legitimacy. The most prominent spokes-
person for this view is Lea Brilmayer, who has forcefully argued 
that a theory of personal jurisdiction must be based on a political 
theory about the circumstances under which government may le-
gitimately exercise coercive power. 34 Other commentators have im-
plicitly and explicitly adopted this view.35 
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly linked per-
sonal jurisdiction to the philosophical problem of political legiti-
macy, this theory of personal jurisdiction helps to explain the link 
between personal jurisdiction and the due process clause. Whenever 
a government acts in excess of its legitimate authority, one can view 
that action as a taking of liberty. Personal jurisdiction doctrine can 
be understood, therefore, as an attempt to delineate the scope of 
one aspect of legitimate state authority.36 
Having conceived of personal jurisdiction doctrine as concern-
ing the scope of legitimate state power, some commentators argue 
that that doctrine does and should incorporate philosophical theo-
ries about the legitimate scope of governmental power. 37 Indeed, 
although the cases do not frame the discussion in terms of political 
52 Id. at 702-03 n.lO (referring to World-Wide Volkswagen). 
55 See Perdue, supra note 19, at 508-09. 
54 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 294; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing, 
supra note 23, at 391. 
55 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884-85; Weisburd, 
supra note 23, at 378. 
56 See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting) (arguing that 
personal jurisdiction concerns the relationship between the defendant and "the sovereign 
that created the court" and whether that sovereign has power over the defendant). 
57 See, e.g., Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 294; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing, 
supra note 23, at 391; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884-85. 
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philosophy, the basic approach seems to fall within a well-established 
philosophical tradition. 
This basic approach is apparent in Asahi.38 Notwithstanding the 
division of the Court in that case, the Justices agreed that '"the 
constitutional touchstone' of the determination whether an exercise 
of personal jurisdiction comports with due process 'remains whether 
the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the 
forum State."'39 The Court has repeatedly stressed the requirement 
that the defendant have purposefully affiliated herself in some way 
with the forum.40 The whole concept of "purposeful availment" 
syems to embody the notion of consent41 and falls squarely within 
the social contract philosophical tradition. 42 
Although grounding personal jurisdiction in a social contract 
theory of political legitimacy has its critics, it is attracting a growing 
list of supporters. Linking personal jurisdiction with consent seems 
benign and consistent with basic democratic values and with a goal 
of enhancing individual autonomy. Closer examination reveals that 
it is seriously problematic. 
A. Critique of Consent as a justification for State judicial Power 
The concept that legitim~te government power derives only 
from the voluntary consent of the governed is deeply rooted in our 
political history. This concept is reflected in the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble of the Constitution, and a number of 
38 The Court was divided on whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the 
forum, although eight justices agreed that jurisdiction was unreasonably burdensome under 
the facts of the case. See Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal jurisdiction: A 
Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DuKE L.J. 669, 
683. . 
39 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J.) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudezwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). See 
Maltz, supra note 19, at 1059-60, 1066; Stewart, supra note 23, at 6. 
40 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 291, 294-95 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91-94 (1978); 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04, 216-17 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958). 
41 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 306; Maltz, supra note 19, at 1060; 
Stein, supra note 19, at 708 n.91; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; Weber, Purposeful Availment, 
39 S.C.L. REv. 815, 832 (1988). Professor Stein notes that "the current trend in jurisdictional 
discussions attempts to use some form of consent as the sole legitimating factor." Stein, supra 
note 19, at 708 n.91. 
42 See Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 307; Brilmayer, Shaping & Sharing, 
supra note 34, at 411-12; Maltz, supra note 20, at 1060; Stewart, supra note 23, at 19; 
Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 889. 
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early state constitutions. 43 All consent theories share a common core 
"which maintains that the political obligations of citizens are 
grounded in their personal performance of a voluntary act which 
is the deliberate undertaking of an obligation."44 These theories, 
which are premised on a belief in individual autonomy,45 have great 
intuitive appeal. 
Notwithstanding their appeal, consent theories have significant 
flaws as a basis for political obligation. The major difficulties stem 
from the fact that, although explicit consent may be a relatively 
uncontroversial basis for establishing political legitimacy, explicit 
consent simply does not occur all that frequently. Thus, any rea-
sonably inclusive consent theory of political legitimacy must rely on 
some form of tacit consent. Tacit consent provides the real quagmire 
for consent theory. 
There are two categories of tacit consent. 46 First, tacit consent 
occurs when there is an actual knowing and voluntary acceptance 
of obligations, but the acceptance is communicated through conduct 
or even silence. A major difficulty with this type of consent is that 
in order to determine the scope of that consent, and whether, in 
fact, consent occurred, rules must be developed for interpreting or 
delineating the significance of the citizen's conduct.47 This interpre-
tation can occur only against a set of well understood background 
conditions.48 The interpretation of conduct will be particularly dif-
ficult where consent includes the possibility of limited consent, that 
is, consent to some but not all exercises of authority. Nonetheless, 
some version of limited consent is essential if consent theory is to 
explain modern personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
A central component of such doctrine is the distinction between 
specific and general jurisdiction.49 Some types of conduct are con-
4S See J.W. GouGH, THE SociAL CONTRACT 230-31 (2d ed. 1957). The American version 
of this philosophy is most closely identified with John Locke, but variations are reflected in 
a wide range of modem philosophers as well as legal commentators. See, e.g., J. RAwLS, A 
THEORY OF jUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); P. 
SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985). 
« A.j. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57 (1979). 
45 See id. at 69. 
46 See generaUy id. at 88-90. 
47 See Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989) [hereinafter 
Consent & Contract]; Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301. 
48 Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REv. 79, 92-94 (1981). As 
Professor Murphy has observed: "Thus, even in the best of tacit consent cases, the ice is thin. 
When the normal background conditions are lacking, there is no ice at all." Id. at 93. 
49 The terminology derives from von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136-45 (1966). See Helicopteros Nacionales de 
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sidered sufficient to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction on 
any suit; other conduct subjects the defendant to jurisdiction on 
only a particular type of suit. To translate this distinction into the 
language of consent, some conduct indicates consent to a broad 
range of government authority; other conduct reflects consent to 
limited government authority. Given the wide range of obligations 
that a person might accept by her conduct, it will be very difficult 
to know with any confidence what was in fact intended by that 
conduct. 
Assuming it is possible to develop rules for interpreting con-
duct, another problem remains. There is little reason to believe that 
this type of actual consent, which is merely tacitly communicated, 
occurs much more frequently than explicit consent.50 Thus, it be-
comes necessary to resort to a different type of tacit consent. 
The second type of tacit consent does not focus on whether the 
citizen in fact voluntarily accepted an obligation. Instead, the ques-
tion is whether the citizen has engaged in some voluntary conduct 
that creates an obligation. The critical difference is that with this 
second type of "consent," legitimacy does not depend on whether 
the person has in fact voluntarily accepted the obligation. Instead, 
regardless of what a person meant or intended, when people engage 
in certain conduct, it is fair, appropriate, or legitimate to impose 
obligations on them. 
Some commentators criticize this type of tacit consent as not 
being consent at all.51 This critique, however, is not adequate, par-
ticularly in the area of personal jurisdiction. Proponents of the tacit 
consent approach would argue that the name "tacit consent" is 
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984). See generally Brilmayer, Related 
Contacts and Personal jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444 (1988) [hereinafter Related Contacts]; 
Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth, & O'Brien, A General Look at General juris-
diction, 66 TEX. L. REv. 721 (1988) [hereinafter General jurisdiction]; Twitchell, The Myth of 
General jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610 (1988). 
50 See AJ. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 93. 
51 See D. HuME, Of the Original Contract, in 2 EsSAYS AND TREATISES 268,281-82 (London 
1770). Hume argues: 
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave 
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from 
day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a 
man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; 
though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and 
perish, the moment he leaves her. 
Id. See also A.J. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 83-84; Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301; Murphy, 
supra note 48, at 92; Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-!, 59 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 990, 995 (1965); 
.stewart, supra note 35, at 17. 
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misleading. Their position is simply that a state can legitimately 
exercise authority only over those who have, through their conduct, 
manifested a willing affiliation with the state.52 "Consent" in the 
sense of some actual agreement is not necessary for legitimacy, but 
some form of voluntary affiliating conduct is required. 53 Cases and 
commentators suggest different versions of this type of tacit con-
sent. As discussed below, none is satisfactory. 
1. Receipt of Benefits 
Under one version of tacit consent, obligations arise from the 
acceptance of benefits. Both Hart and Rawls have developed this 
concept54 and the personal jurisdiction case law contains versions 
of it as well. 55 
Most recently, Justice Brennan in his plurality opinion in Burn-
ham appears to endorse this approach.56 In finding that transient 
jurisdiction is consistent with modern notions of due process, Justice 
Brennan stressed the numerous benefits that a transient receives 
simply by entering the forum state: "[h]is health and safety are 
guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emerging medical ser-
vices; he is free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; he 
likely enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well."57 
It is not clear whether Justice Brennan believes that the accep-
tance of these benefits is simply evidence of actual consent, albeit 
tacitly communicated, or whether he is relying on a kind of quasi-
contract theory58 that regardless of intent, it is intrinsically fair to 
extract the price of personal jurisdiction from those who accept 
52 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 18-19; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 890. 
55 For this reason, even explicit denials of consent presumably would not be effective. 
Those who accept tacit consent as the foundation for jurisdiction would surely say that an 
Oregon citizen who sent a letter to the Secretary of State of California explicitly announcing 
that he was withholding his consent to jurisdiction could nonetheless be sued in California 
for damages that person caused when driving through California. 
54 See Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? 64 PHIL. REv. 175, 185 (Apr. 1955); Rawls, 
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAw AND PHILOSOPHY, at 10 (S. Hooked. 1964). 
55 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
319 (1945); Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 302-25 and cases discussed therein. 
56 Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2124-25 (1990) (Brennan, J. concur-
ring). 
57 Id. at 2125. 
58 See A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 19, at 50 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS§ 3A, at 12-15 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970). 
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benefits from the state. 59 If Justice Brennan means to use the ben-
efits as evidence of consent, then he is relying on the first type of 
tacit consent described earlier, and his argument suffers from all of 
its difficulties. 60 In particular, it is virtually impossible to interpret 
meaningfully the defendant's conduct. The mere fact that the de-
fendant entered the state offers scant evidence that he in fact vol-
untarily accepted the burden of personal jurisdiction for any suit 
that might be filed against him. 
The benefits approach does not fare much better as a quasi-
contract theory. On a practical level, if the approach is to be effec-
tive, some method must exist for valuing and comparing benefits 
and burdens. This problem is well illustrated by Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Burnham. Justice Brennan asserts that the burden to a 
transient of being subject to jurisdiction is "slight" and the benefits 
provided by the state are "significant,"61 but he offers little to dem-
onstrate the correctness of this assertion. 
In at least some cases, the benefits of roads and protections 
available to transients are surely not commensurate with the bur-
dens of being subjected to jurisdiction. The voluntary presence of 
the transient may be very brief; the state may not in fact be the 
provider of many of the services listed by Justice Brennan,62 and, 
in some cases, the burden of distant litigation may be great. 63 I 
believe Justice Scalia is correct when he observes that viewing tran-
59 See Stein, supra note 19, at 700 (noting that it is frequently difficult to tell whether 
the Court means that '1urisdiction [is] fair because the exchange of benefits is evidence of a 
voluntary affiliation, or because the exchange is substantively fair"). 
60 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of this type of tacit 
consent and its difficulties. 
6 1 Burnham, l1 0 S. Ct. at 2125 (Brennan, J ., concurring). 
62 For example, police, fire, and emergency services may be provided by local govern· 
ments. 
63 See Stein, supra note 19, at 736. Justice Brennan enumerates a list of procedural 
devices that, according to him, limit the burdens of distant litigation. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. 
at 2125 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring). The devices he lists, however, will not always be 
available or helpful. For example, dismissal or summary judgment will not be available where 
there is a cognizable claim and a genuine dispute of fact. Similarly, although certain discovery 
devices such as telephone depositions may be available, these may also be less effective and, 
moreover, none of these devices eliminates the difficulties that may be inherent in locating 
and dealing with a lawyer who may be thousands of miles away. Most strikingly, the option 
of a change of venue to a different state is only available in federal court, and hence is 
irrelevant where it is a state that attempts to assert jurisdiction. Finally, the fact that some 
suits might be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens is also completely irrelevant. 
The problem of whether a state has authority to assert personal jurisdiction only arises if the 
state attempts to exercise jurisdiction. 
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sient jurisdiction as a contractual bargain, the rule is "unconscion-
abl[e]."64 
Even assuming some basis exists for concluding that the benefits 
to a transient are commensurate with the burdens of jurisdiction, 
further complications remain. First, the benefits are not dependent 
on the defendant having been served in the forum. Thus, if we 
were to take this approach seriously, anyone who has ever been 
present within a state should be subject to any suit in that state, 
regardless of whether they were served there.65 Moreover, even 
· people who have never visited a state may benefit in the ways listed 
by Justice Brennan. One need not enter a state to benefit from a 
state's economy or its transportation system.66 
In ad.dition to these problems, a benefits analysis of state au-
thority is incomplete. In the area of personal jurisdiction, situations 
can arise in which the defendant has received no benefits but juris-
diction is nonetheless appropriate. Calder v. jones67 is the most ob-
vious example. In Calder, the Florida writer of the defamatory 
article about a California resident did not receive any meaningful 
benefits from California (at least none beyond those received by all 
employees of corporations doing business in California). Yet, the 
Supreme Court unanimously upheld personal jurisdiction. 68 Many 
other tort cases may similarly prove difficult to fit into the benefits 
model. 
The benefits approach also poses theoretical difficulties. As a 
theory of governmental legitimacy, it is troubling. Even if we can 
develop a standard for assessing whether benefits and burdens are 
commensurate, it is deeply disturbing to suggest that as long as 
government provides you with something of objective value (that 
you may not want), it can legitimately extract something from you 
(that you do not want to give up).69 
64 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117. 
65 See id. 
66 The annual fires in the West that do not respect state boundaries demonstrate that 
one may benefit quite significantly by the fire services provided by another state. 
67 465 u.s. 783 (1984). 
68 /d. at 791. 
69 Robert Nozick makes a similar point, arguing that "[o]ne cannot, whatever one's 
purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment." R. 
NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 95 (1974). John Simmons has noted that the Nozick 
argument may be unpersuasive where the individual has affirmatively sought and not merely 
passively received the benefits. JJ. SIMMONS, supra note 44, at 122-29. As Simmons has also 
noted, however, most of the benefits provided by governments are public goods, or what he 
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2. Voluntary Affiliation 
Several commentators who have argued that personal jurisdic-
tion should incorporate a consent theory of legitimacy have offered 
another variation on tacit consent. They have argued that, although 
consent in the form of actual agreement is not necessary to legiti-
macy, some form of voluntary "affiliating conduct" is required70 in 
order to protect the "right to remain unconnected to a sovereign."71 
By requiring voluntary affiliating conduct, we limit governmental 
power in a way that reaffirms both the principal of individual au-
tonomy and the notion that governmental legitimacy derives from 
the people. 
In order to use this approach to explain personal jurisdiction 
doctrine, rules must be developed that delineate what voluntary 
actions are "sufficiently affiliating" to legitimate the exercise of 
power. The rules for inferring consent must exist independently of 
the supposedly affiliating conduct and must be justified on some 
other basis.72 Thus, we need some meta theory of legitimacy, inde-
pendent of consent, to justify the rules for inferring consent.73 
The problem of developing and justifying these meta rules is 
highlighted by a series of examples drawn from personal jurisdic-
tion. First, if writing a derogatory article in Florida about someone 
from California is enough affiliation to sue in California for defa-
mation, 74 could a Florida publisher who purchased that article in 
Florida from the writer be sued in California for failing to pay the 
promised royalties? Has not the publisher affiliated himself with 
California when he knowingly purchased an article about Califor-
nia? Second, it is generally accepted that a court has personal juris-
diction over the plaintiff for all counterclaims, both permissive and 
compulsory, filed against the plaintiff in that suit.75 But why is it 
calls "open" benefits. Id. at 138. "It is precisely in cases of 'open' benefits that it is least 
plausible to suggest that benefits are being accepted by most beneficiaries." Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
70 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 18; Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 890. 
71 Stewart, supra note 23, at 7. 
72 See Brilmayer, Consent & Contract, supra note 47, at 9. 
75 The problem here is similar to a problem that exists with the first type of tacit consent. 
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. There are, however, important differences. 
With the first type of tacit consent, rules of interpretation are necessary to determine whether 
a person in fact meant his or her conduct or silence to constitute consent. One might argue 
that the development of these rules is no different than the problem of developing language. 
By contrast, the second type of consent requires what might be called "rules of law" that 
assigns consequences regardless of what was intended. 
74 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984). 
75 See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). 
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not the case that having once invoked the jurisdiction of a particular 
court a plaintiff becomes subject to personal jurisdiction for all other 
lawsuits that might be filed against him in that jurisdiction? By filing 
one suit, the plaintiff has voluntarily recognized the legitimacy of a 
state's judicial mechanism. Why should the plaintiff later be able to 
disavow that recognition of legitimacy?76 Finally, if one has volun-
tarily sold one's goods in, or voluntarily traveled through, a partic-
ular state, why is that not enough to subject one to suit in that state 
on any matter (regardless of where one is served with process)? 
In a possible response to these examples, Professor Stewart has 
argued that "the right to remain unconnected with a sovereign may 
be simultaneously waived and retained with respect to different 
aspects of one's activities."" She then asserts that claims must be 
"related" to the defendant's activities.78 It is not obvious why the 
right to remain unconnected to a sovereign also necessarily carries 
the right to connect oneself less than completely. Moreover, the 
assertion that suits must be related to the affiliating conduct simply 
restates the issue, it does not explain why this must be so. The 
answers to these questions turn ultimately_ on how much the state 
may legitimately extract as a price for different types of conduct. 
The fact that there was "voluntary affiliating conduct," however, 
drops out of the analysis in this assessment. What becomes impor-
tant is some theory about the scope of legitimate state power. 
Treating the voluntary affiliating conduct of the defendant as 
the source of legitimacy is not merely unhelpful, it cloaks govern-
mental power with a veil of consent in a way that is destructive of 
individual dignity.79 Consider the following example. Suppose that 
the government passes a law that states that any woman who exposes 
any portion of her body is sexually provocative and shall be deemed 
to have consented to the sexual advances of any man, but that 
consent will not be imputed to any woman who does not so expose 
herself and the government will take efforts to protect these non-
exposed women. One response to this law is that it gives women 
great protection and autonomy; now women have the ability to 
76 One might argue that the plaintiff may have had no choice other than that particular 
forum and therefore the filing of the suit could hardly be considered a voluntary acceptance 
of that forum. The plaintiff, however, may or may not have had alternate fora. Moreover, 
even if the plaintiff had no other available fora, she elected to attempt to convert her chose 
in action into a judgment rather than abandoning it or selling it to someone else. 
77 Stewart, supra note 23, at 21. 
78 Id. at 25. 
79 See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1301. 
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behave in a way that will protect them from undesired sexual ad-
vances. But many women would not view this law as enhancing their 
autonomy. Because the government is presenting women with a 
choice they do not think they should have to make, the fact that 
they subsequently engage in some voluntary conduct, such as ex-
posing their ankles, does not legitimize an exercise of power against 
them, such as a sexual assault. 80 
Rules about voluntary affiliation enhance individual autonomy 
only to the extent they are perceived by the individual as embodying 
legitimate and fair choices. Voluntary affiliation is not what legitim-
izes an exercise of power; what legitimizes the action is our belief 
that the exercised· power is one that states should have.81 
Another example can be drawn from the personal jurisdiction 
case law. In the Supreme Court case of Kulko v. Superior Court,82 a 
father sent his child to California to live with his ex-wife. When the 
ex-wife sued the father in California for increased child support, 
the Supreme Court held that California lacked personal jurisdic-
tion. 83 Had the defendant sent a defamatory article84 or exploding 
package to California, such acts surely would have been sufficient 
to support jurisdiction. In explaining why sending a child to Cali-
fornia was not sufficient for jurisdiction, the Court suggested that 
its real concern was that a contrary conclusion might "impose an 
unreasonable burden on family relations."85 Thus, the Court fo-
cused less on the defendant's voluntary affiliated conduct and fo-
cused more on whether the state could legitimately force the father 
to choose between accommodating his child's wishes and thereby 
subjecting himself to jurisdiction, or overriding those wishes to 
protect himself from jurisdiction. 86 
80 See B.rilmayer, Contract & Consent, supra note 47, at 21 (noting that "[b]y focusing on 
choice, ... consent theory discourages analysis of an unresolved and important problem: 
how did the individual come to have that set of choices and not another?"). 
81 Hanna Pitkin has made a related point about Locke. She has observed that under 
Locke's approach, once someone had fallen within the scope of the state's legitimate power 
then virtually any conduct was enough to create consent. See Pitkin, supra note 51, at 996. 
Ultimately, the fact of consent is irrelevant. According to Pitkin, "[y]ou do not consent to be 
obligated, but rather are obligated to consent if the government is just." I d. at 999. Pitkin 
has also noted that Locke's theory of consent was intended not only to justify occasional 
revolutions, it was also intended to legitimize most exercises of power. Pitkin, Obligation and 
Consent-11, 60 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. 39, 49 (1966). 
82 436 u.s. 84 (1978). 
83 Id. at 100-01. 
84 See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 
F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982). 
ss Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98. 
86 As I discuss later, I do not believe the Court offered any plausible reason why 
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3. Brilmayer's Fairness Approach 
Professor Brilmayer, who has argued that personal jurisdiction 
should be based upon a political philosophy of governmental legit-
imacy, has offered another approach. 87 She has acknowledged the 
inadequacy of all the currently advanced theories, 88 including those 
of tacit consent, 89 observing that "theories of tacit consent assume 
almost exactly what they set out to prove."90 As an alternative to 
tacit consent, Professor Brilmayer has argued that we should aban-
don consent and apply a "fairness" inquiry that would consider 
"whether an individual's connections with a state are such as to 
make it fair to impose upon him or her the state's conception of 
substantive justice."91 A volitional act must connect a non-domicili-
ary with a state in order "to assure a minimal level of individual 
control over the legal norms to which the individual will be sub-
jected."92 Although she offered this formulation of the "fairness" 
argument in the context of choice of law, a similar approach might 
be offered for personal jurisdiction. 
Brilmayer's approach is a variation of the voluntary affiliation 
argument and shares many of the same problems. She offers little 
to explain what conduct should or should not be deemed an exercise 
of control. Consider a confused tourist visiting Washington, D.C., 
who gets lost and mistakenly crosses a bridge into Virginia. It is 
appropriate that the tourist be required to comply with Virginia 
traffic laws and that she be subject to suit in Virginia for any injuries 
that she happens to cause there. It is completely artificial, however, 
to suggest that by crossing the Potomac River the tourist has made 
a meaningful choice of legal norms. 
In contrast to the confused togrist, consider a D.C. resident 
who regularly drives in Virginia. If the D.C. resident hits a Virginia 
pedestrian while driving in D.C., could she be sued in Virginia? 
Her regular and knowing use of Virginia roads would seem to 
California should not have the power to assert jurisdiction in that case. But in analyzing this 
core issue, the Kulko Court properly treated as irrelevant the defendant's "voluntary affiliating 
conduct." See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
87 See Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1277, 1304-06 (1989) 
[hereinafter Rights & Fairness]; Brilmayer, Consent & Contract, supra note 47, at 10-14. 
88 Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, at 308-10. 
89 See Brilmayer, Rights & Fairness, supra note 87, at 1304-06; Brilmayer, Consent & 
Contract, supra note 47, at 10-14. 
90 Brilmayer, Rights & Fairness, supra note 87, at 1304. 
91 Id. at 1306. 
92 Id. at 1307. 
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demonstrate much more of an acceptance 'of the legal norms of 
Virginia than was demonstrated by the confused tourist. Suppose 
that in addition to regularly driving in Virginia, the D.C. resident 
participated in political campaigns and debate in Virginia. Would 
this be sufficient to make her subject to suit in Virginia? 
In explaining why some applications should be considered suf-
ficient and others not, Brilmayer has argued that a "state cannot 
justify predicating jurisdiction upon local conduct that is not legally 
wrongful."93 If the goal of jurisdiction is to assure some individual 
control of the applicable legal norms, however, Brilmayer has no 
reason to differentiate between legal and illegal conduct. In fact, 
engaging in illegal or wrongful conduct in a state seems on its face 
to demonstrate a rejection of that state's legal norms. 
B. Problems with Linking Interstate Personal Jurisdiction and Political 
Philosophy 
Although an inquiry into the foundations of political legitimacy 
can be fascinating, treating personal jurisdiction as an outgrowth of 
this inquiry produces significant difficulties. At the outset, if a co-
herent doctrine of personal jurisdiction depends on the develop-
ment and acceptance of a coherent philosophy of political legiti-
macy, then we are in for a long fight.94 The problem of political 
legitimacy has troubled philosophers for centuries. Even if a con-
sensus were achieved, variations within the same general philosoph-
ical approach may produce significantly different results when ap-
plied to personal jurisdiction. For example, Professor Trangsrud, 
who argues that personal jurisdiction ought to reflect a social con-
tract theory of political legitimacy, describes the contours of per-
sonal jurisdiction based on such a theory. 95 Basically, he would 
require knowing, affiliating conduct on the part of the defendant.96 
Yet, a different version of the social contract approach, such as that 
of Rawls,97 might produce a very different doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction. Someone designing a personal jurisdiction doctrine 
9s Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 740. 
94 Brilmayer, in the same article in which she argues that any theory of jurisdiction 
should be based upon a philosophical theory of governmental legitimacy, acknowledges the 
inadequacy of all the currently advanced theories. Brilmayer, Political Theory, supra note 23, 
at 308-10. 
95 Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 898-903. 
96 Id. at 890. 
97 See]. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). 
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behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance,"98 with no knowledge of whether 
she would be a plaintiff or defendant, might design a system without 
the heavy defendant bias of either our existing or the Trangsrud 
approach. 99 
More fundamentally, even if we could reach complete agree-
ment on the philosophical theory to apply, it simply does not follow 
that our philosophical ideals about legitimate governmental power 
must necessarily be reflected in a constitutional doctrine of interstate 
personal jurisdiction.100 It is not merely that the philosophical ap-
proach is unduly generalized or theoretical.101 The problem is that 
political philosophy cannot tell us whether our Constitution contem-
plates a system in which state adjudicatory authority is constitution-
ally limited. 
With respect to interstate personal jurisdiction, the issue is not 
under what circumstances people must respect political authority 
or the authority of a wholly unrelated sovereign. We are already 
one nation of interdependent states, bound by shared values and 
one constitution. Inherent in our existence as a nation is that each 
state and its citizens necessarily accepts the political legitimacy of all 
the other states.102 Concerns about political legitimacy might appro-
priately underlie personal jurisdiction in the international, but not 
m the interstate, context. 103 The difference between Florida and 
98 See id. at 136-42. 
99 Applying Rawls's principle of "maximin," id. at 154, one would expect those behind 
the veil of ignorance to adopt procedural rules that allocate burdens relatively evenly between 
plaintiffs and defendants since that minimizes the losses suffered by anyone who ends up as 
a litigant. 
100 See Laycock, Equality and the Citizens of Sister States, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 431, 432-
33 ( 1987) (questioning the usefulness of political philosophy in providing answers to questions 
about interstate relations). 
101 See id. at 432. 
102 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to recognize certain governmental acts 
of other states); id. § 4 (guaranteeing to every state "a Republican Form of Government"). 
The undeniable interdependence created among the states by the Constitution seems to pose 
a particular problem for those who would rely on a theory of tacit consent to limit state 
adjudicatory power. In "consenting" to a nation consisting of interdependent states and 
accepting the benefits that accrue from the free interstate flow of goods and people, why 
have not all United States residents "consented" to be sued in any state? Professor Trangsrud's 
response to this question appears to be that the Constitution does not specifically address the 
question of state jurisdiction and therefore, it is reading too much into the situation to infer 
consent from mere acceptance of the Constitution. Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 887. Yet, 
this seems no more of an overreading than inferring "consent" to jurisdiction from the act 
of driving a car in the state, see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), or from the act of 
writing a defamatory article, see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
tos As Professor Laycock has observed, "[t]he relationship among the American states is 
fundamentally different from the relationship among independent nations." Laycock, supra 
548 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:529 
California on the one hand and Florida and Iran on the other is 
not merely one of degree. 104 
The Constitution clearly contemplates the existence of states 
that are delineated geographically. The Constitution also contem-
plates that citizens of the United States will have a unique relation-
ship with one state and not the others, that is, they will be citizens 
of that state.105 As a corollary of the unique relationship between a 
state and its citizens, those citizens will have unique rights, such as 
voting, and unique obligations, such as jury duty. But the fact that 
an admittedly special relationship between a state and its citizens 
exists does not mean that no relationship exists between a state and 
noncitizens. The Constitution in fact contemplates that interaction 
will arise between states and noncitizens and that states will be 
asserting power against noncitizens (hence, the privileges and im-
munities clause). The core question with regard to personal juris-
diction is how does the Constitution limit the exercise of state ad-
judicative authority. 
Once one accepts that states are not wholly autonomous and 
separate from each other, it becomes very difficult to base personal 
jurisdiction doctrine on a theory of political obligation.106 For ex-
ample, one could accept a traditional consent theory of political 
legitimacy yet still conclude that states have unlimited adjudicatory 
authority by arguing that by participating in our interdependent 
nation with its free interstat~ flow of goods and services, we have 
all consented to be sued in any state. The free flow of commerce 
among the states has many benefits, but one of its costs is that 
note 100, at 432. Professor Maltz argues that by suggesting that a defendant from another 
country should be treated differently than United States citizens, the Court had recognized 
that a citizen of one state is "already indirectly connected" to all the other states "through 
the structure of the federal system," whereas, "a citizen of a foreign country has no such 
automatic connection." Maltz, supra note 28, at 690. 
104 A comparison of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), with the Salman Rushdie 
affair demonstrates how differently we view the question of the legitimacy of governmental 
power when it is exercised in the international rather than interstate context. In Calder, the 
Supreme Court held that a Florida writer and editor of an allegedly defamatory article 
concer~ing a Californian could properly be sued in California because California was "the 
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered." I d. at 789. Calder was a unanimous 
decision, yet there would surely not be similar unanimity that a Florida citizen who authored 
a book considered by Iranians to be defamatory has likewise subjected himself to the gov-
ernmental processes of Iran. 
105 See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art III,§ 2 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases between 
"Citizens of different States"). 
106 See Tushnet, Community and Fairness in Democratic Theory, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 417, 
423-42 (1987). 
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interstate commerce sometimes produces detrimental effects on 
places far away from one of the participants in a transaction. Having 
accepted the benefits of our free flowing economy, it is fair to 
impose the burden of possible distant litigation. 
Moreover, even if one were to accept that state adjudicatory 
authority turns on whether the exercise of power conforms to an 
underlying philosophy of what constitutes legitimate authority, this 
view does not explain why the federal courts need to intrude on 
states by striking down state exercises of authority. The Constitution 
provides a simple, non-intrusive solution-diversity jurisdiction. In 
most cases in which a state would be asserting jurisdiction over 
noncitizens, it is likely that diversity would exist and the case could 
be removed to the federal court (assuming of course Congress 
authorized diversity jurisdiction and removal). Whatever connection 
one believes is necessary to make legitimate a state's assertion of 
jurisdiction over a citizen of some other state, the requisite connec-
tion surely exists between a United States citizen or resident and a 
United States court. 107 The combination of the privileges and im-
munities clause, assuring equal treatment for those who choose to 
litigate before a "foreign sovereign," and the option to litigate be-
fore one's own sovereign, i.e., the United States, solves the problem. 
One might complain that removing the case to federal court 
does not move the case out of state and thus the federal judge and 
jury will have local ties. This concern focuses more on local bias (an 
issue that has never been addressed by personal jurisdiction doc-
trine) than on the sovereign's identity. The more c~mpelling re-
sponse is that removal does not cause a change in venue because 
Congress did not choose to structure the courts that way. No con-
stitutional requirement exists that federal districts be coextensive 
with the states108 or that removal be to the federal district that 
includes the state in which the action was filed. Removal could be 
to federal court in the defendant's home state or to some other 
location. Thus, the Constitution gives the federal government a 
mechanism for protecting citizens from having to litigate before 
sovereigns with whom they do not have the requisite affiliation. 
Given the availability of this mechanism, no reason founded on 
political philosophy exists why the federal courts should create their 
107 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 
421 (1932); see also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
108 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-04 (1878). 
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own elaborate doctrine, which directly intrudes on state autonomy 
and authority. 109 
II. OTHER jusTIFICATIONS FOR CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE 
ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY-COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALOGY 
In addition to, or as an alternative to, the political legitimacy 
and consent rationale, commentators have suggested that commerce 
clause-related concerns may justify limitations on personal jurisdic-
tion.uo This approach is related in some respects to the political 
legitimacy rationale. Federal intervention into state regulation based 
on the commerce clause has been justified as a means for preventing 
states from imposing costs on outsiders who are not represented in 
the state's political processes.m One might characterize this justifi-
cation as a matter of democratic theoryl12 or economic efficiency.ll3 
At first glance, personal jurisdiction seems to fit easily into a 
similar type of analysis. For example, assertions of jurisdiction over 
outsiders might be a way for states to shift litigation costs from its 
citizens to outsiders.u4 In fact, in a handful of pre-International 
Shoe115 cases, the United States Supreme Court directly invoked the 
109 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), indicates that in at least some contexts the 
Court has been reluctant to infer constitutional limitations of state adjudicatory authority. In 
Hall, the Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit a California state court from 
adjudicating a claim against the state of Nevada. /d. at 426-27. In so holding, the Court 
acknowledged that the Constitution does contain some specific limitation on state sovereignty, 
but rejected the argument that the Constitution implicitly prohibits states from adjudicating 
suits against other states. /d. at 424-25. The Court observed: 
[I]n view of the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to 
the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States are rderved to the States 
or to the people, the existence of express limitations on state sovereignty may 
equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding that unstated 
limitations on state power were intended by the Framers. 
/d. at 425 (footnote omitted). A constitutional doctrine of personal jurisdiction is likewise an 
inferred limit on state sovereignty and a similar caution would seem to be appropriate. 
110 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86-87; Brilmayer, General 
Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 743-46; Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the juris-
diction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 226, 234 (1967); Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 88.1; 
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Ann jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 156, 
174-77 (1982). 
111 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); South Carolina State 
Highway Dep't v. Barnell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). 
112 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 409 (2d ed. 1988). 
113 See Tushnet, Rethinking the Donnant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wise. L. REv. 125, 142-
43. 
114 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86-87; Brilmayer, General juris-
diction, supra note 49, at 743; Carrington & Martin, supra note 110, at 234; Trangsrud, supra 
note 23, at 881; Comment, supra note llO, at 174-77. 
115 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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commerce clause to strike down what it viewed as overly expansive 
exercises of state court jurisdiction. 116 
Although some courts and commentators have viewed these 
cases as moribund, 117 the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises118 may indicate a revival of the 
Court's direct reliance on the commerce clause to limit personal 
jurisdiction. In Bendix, the Court struck down, on commerce clause 
grounds, an Ohio statute that suspended the statute of limitations 
for all claims against foreign entities that had not designated an 
agent for service of process in Ohio.l19 Noting that the presence of 
an agent for service of process would subject the corporation to 
general jurisdiction, the Court held that requiring a corporation to 
submit to general jurisdiction is a "significant burden" on interstate 
commerce. ~'20 
Although this commerce clause approach has some intuitive 
appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny. This approach, like dormant 
commerce clause analysis, includes two separate concerns-undue 
burdens on interstate commerce and discrimination against out-of-
staters.121 Neither concern provides a satisfactory explanation for 
personal jurisdiction. 
A. Undue Burdens 
Commentators have suggested that a state's overly aggressive 
assertion 0f personal jurisdiction may impede interstate commerce 
because producers, fearful that they may have to litigate in some 
116 See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1929); Atchison, T. & S.F. 
Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316 
(1923). For a discussion of these cases by Judge Friendly, see Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & 
P.R.R., 439 F.2d 17, 25-27 (2d Cir. 1970) (rehearing en bane). 
117 See Scanapico, 439 F.2d at 28 (Hys, ]., concurring) (characterizing these cases as 
reflecting "a long-outmoded view of 'burden on interstate commerce"'); F. jAMES & G. 
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 2.29, at 103 (3d ed. 1985) (arguing that the Court's rejection in 
personal jurisdiction doctrine of special protection of first amendment concerns implies a 
similar rejection of special protection for interstate commerce); Dessem, Personal jurisdiction 
after Asahi: The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. 41, 87-88 (1987) (same). Cf 
Comment, supra note 110, at 175 ("[t]he constitutional interest in facilitating interstate com-
merce seems to require additional jurisdiction limitations beyond the minimum safeguards 
of causation, notice, and relevance provided by due process"); Developments in the Law: State 
Court jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 983-87 (1960) (urging reliance on commerce clause 
as a limitation on personal jurisdiction). 
118 486 u.s. 888 (1988). 
119 I d. at 894. 
120 Id. at 891-92. 
121 See id. at 891; Tushnet, supra note 113, at 130-31. 
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distant forum, may either curtail production or increase prices. 122 
Thus, proponents of this view might argue that if the car dealer in 
World-Wide Volkswagen123 could be sued anywhere that the car he 
sold blew up, then he would have to curtail his sales or raise the 
price of his cars in order to cover the costs of this additional risk. 
In effect, the risk of litigation in distant fora impedes interstate 
commerce. 
This argument about burdening commerce ignores the teach-
ing of Ronald Coase that the allocation of external effects does not 
affect economic efficiency.124 Litigation necessarily involves two par-
ties and when they are from different states, at least one of those 
parties will necessarily be forced to bear the cost and disadvantage 
of litigation away from home.125 Personal jurisdiction doctrine sim-
ply allocates the right not to have to travel for litigation, but there 
is no theoretical reason why systematically giving that right to de-
fendants rather than plaintiffs will alter the number of transactions. 
To return to World-Wide Volkswagen, a buyer of the car will value 
the car somewhat less if she knows she will have to return to New 
York for any litigation no matter where she is when her dispute 
with the seller arises. 
The failure of the Court and commentators to perceive the 
two-sided nature of the jurisdiction problem extends to the non-
commercial context as well. In Kulka, the Court held that a divorced 
father who, "in the interests of family harmony and his children's 
preferences," allowed his children to spend more time in California 
with their mother than the separation agreement required, could 
not be sued in California for increased child support. 126 The Court 
did not want to "discourage parents from entering into reasonable 
visitation agreements."127 But this reasoning ignores that coopera-
tion is two-sided. As a result of the Court's ruling, the parent who 
relies on child-support may be discouraged from accommodating 
the desires (and maybe best interests) of her children because of 
122 See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 745; Comment, supra note 110, 
at 174. 
123 444 u.s. 286 (1980). 
124 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). See generally Demsetze, 
When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972). 
12s See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1298-99. 
126 436 u.s. 84, 94 (1978). 
127 I d. at 93; see Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1298. Interestingly, although Professor Gottlieb 
criticized the Court for its failure in commercial cases to understand that the burden to travel 
must rest somewhere, he praised the Court's analysis in Kulko. Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 
1298. 
May 1991] PERSONAL JURISDICTION 553 
the burdens associated with seeking the needed increases in sup-
port. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, transaction costs or informa-
tion imbalances may exist so that allocating the right not to travel 
could have efficiency implications. For example, one could argue 
that the buyer should bear the cost of distant litigation because the 
buyer is able, at least theoretically, to ascertain in advance where a 
product was made or sold, whereas the seller can never be sure 
where its products may end up. Therefore, the buyer can calculate 
with greater certainty the cost of distant litigation. 
This argument has a number of weaknesses. First, the requisite 
cost calculation requires information about the costs associated with 
distant litigation as well as the likelihood of litigation. The seller 
may be in a better position to acquire this information. Second, 
although it may be theoretically possible for a buyer to ascertain 
the place of manufacture or distribution, the costs of acquiring this 
information for individual products may be impractical. Finally, this 
argument focuses on buyers and sellers, whereas personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine focuses on plaintiffs and defendants. Although in tort 
litigation buyers are typically the plaintiffs and sellers the defen-
dants, these roles are certainly not true in contract litigation.128 
The foregoing discussion of the effects of distant litigation on 
buyers and sellers illustrates that a thorough assessment of the 
efficiency implications of allocating to one party the right not to 
travel may be quite complicated and require information to which 
the courts do not have easy access. It is also probably impossible to 
generalize this information into a single rule for plaintiffs and 
defendants. At the very least, those who argue that interstate com-
merce will be enhanced by allocating the right not to travel to distant 
fora to all defendants, or at least to defendants who have not 
"purposefully availed," have not yet proven their case. 
Even if a state's broad assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants did impose a burden on interstate commerce, the state's 
conduct would not necessarily be impermissible. Under traditional 
commerce clause analysis, the court would balance the state's inter-
128 See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 
598 (7th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff was the manufacturer), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); 
Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 988-89 (D.C. App. 1981) (plaintiff was a lawyer suing 
former client to recover fees for legal services), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982). Professor 
Gottlieb argues that distant litigation may be the most burdensome on the "one-shot" litigant 
involved in a relatively small case. Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1322-23. There is no reason to 
assume that such litigants will always, or even usually, be defendants. 
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est in jurisdiction against the burdens imposed on the defendant. 129 
The burdens imposed by more expansive personal jurisdiction may 
be quite modest. 130 The burden at issue is not the burden of liti-
gation, because personal jurisdiction does not protect a defendant 
from suit, but rather the incremental additional cost that must be 
incurred by virtue of litigating in some forum other than one's 
home state. This additional cost may be quite small. On the other 
hand, the assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 
may serve a legitimate state interest. In the context of products 
liability, for example, a state might conclude that the burdens of 
distant litigation may be particularly onerous for plaintiffs who tend 
to be one-time players in the legal system, who may find it partic-
ularly difficult to find a lawyer in a different state, and who may 
lack the necessary resources for the upfront costs of distant litiga-
tion. 
Would the burden imposed on the out-of-state defendant in 
such a case outweigh the benefit to local residents? Unfortunately, 
the Court has offered no coherent test to "weigh" these burdens 
and benefits.] ust as the Court seems to have ignored the substantive 
policy choices inherent in its balancing approach to the commerce 
clause, 131 it also seems not to have understood that similar substan-
tive choices are inherent in the decision to allocate to one party 
rather than another the right not to litigate in a distant or unrelated 
forum. 132 
B. Discrimination 
Even if a state's decision to impose the burdens of distant 
litigation on the out-of-state defendant does not burden commerce, 
it could be argued that a systematic shifting of costs from in-staters 
to out-of-staters is exactly the type of protectionist discrimination 
the dormant commerce clause prohibits.133 This argument has sev-
eral problems. First, a protectionist motive is problematic. Allowing 
129 See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., •!86 U.S. 888, 891-92 (1988); Pike v. 
Bruse Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Tushnet, supra note 113, at 135. 
130 See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 776. 
131 See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 896-97 (Scalia,]., concurring); Tushnet, supra note 113, at 
146-47. 
132 This is well-illustrated by Kullw, in which the Court apparently used personal juris-
diction doctrine to promote conciliation and the free flow of children between divorced 
parents. See Kullw v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978). But this goal was achieved at tlte 
expense of the parent who was dependent on child support. 
133 See Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, rupra note 49, at 746. 
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an in-state plaintiff to sue a foreign defendant at the plaintiff's 
home does not clearly produce any net savings for the plaintiff's 
home state. Court systems are expensive to run. The marginal cost 
of providing a forum, minus the savings to the plaintiff, may be 
greater than what it would have cost the plaintiff to litigate else-
where. Thus, a protectionist rationale is not obvious from the mere 
fact that a state is willing to adjudicate these cases.134 
Second, even assuming a protectionist motive, it is not clear 
why states cannot be protectionist in this context. When a plaintiff 
and a defendant are from different states, at least one will unavoid-
ably bear the burden of distant litigation. There are only two op-
tions-either the in-state plaintiff or the out-of-state defendant 
bears the burden. In this context, it seems odd to conclude that the 
Constitution requires states to choose to disadvantage their citi-
zens.135 
It is sometimes argued that notwithstanding a state's legitimate 
interest in providing a forum for its local plaintiffs, a bias in favor 
of defendants is warranted because "society normally gives less 
weight to the interest of the plaintiff who disturbed the tranquility 
and initiated the litigation."136 Whatever the pedigree of the view 
that plaintiffs generally should be regarded as troublemakers, there 
are several difficulties with incorporating it into personal jurisdic- · 
tion doctrine. First, as an empirical description of actual attitudes 
of society, it is disputable that plaintiffs are generally viewed as 
troublemakers. Surely most plaintiffs would describe the situation 
differently and argue that the defendant, not the litigation, dis-
rupted the status quo. As Marc Galanter has reminded us, disputes 
exist before, not because of, litigation. 137 Moreover, in at least some 
15
" Moreover, not all personal jurisdiction cases involve in-state plaintiffs. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Oklahoma was willing to open its 
courts to an out-of-state plaintiff to sue out-of-state defendants. Thus, it was not a case in 
which the forum sought expansive jurisdiction to advantage in-staters to the detriment of 
out-of-staters. 
1ss See Maltz, Visions of Fairness-The Relationship Between jurisdiction and Choice-ofLaw, 
30 Aruz. L. REv. 751, 768 (1988). In the context of choice of law, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that when the forum has a legitimate interest in a controversy, it has no obligation 
to defer to the interests of another state. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-24 (f979); 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939); 
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). 
156 Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of 
Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 335, 351 (1972); see also von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 49, at 1148. 
•s7 Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 12 (1983). 
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contexts, society views litigation as a constructive, socially beneficial 
activity. Provisions for attorneys' fees 138 or treble damages139 are 
designed to encourage the bringing of certain suits.140 
Second, even if an anti-plaintiff bias generally exists, the more 
fundamental question is whether the Constitution mandates that 
states adopt this anti-plaintiffview.141 This question reflects a classic 
problem of defining the appropriate constitutional baseline from 
which to evaluate state power.142 There is certainly no textual basis 
for concluding that states are required to treat litigation as disrup-
tive rather than restorative of the status quo. 143 Where states have 
affirmatively chosen to favor one side in litigation, there is no reason 
why the Constitution should displace that choice.144 
The final problem with the discrimination explanation of per-
sonal jurisdiction is one of remedy. If a state's assertion of jurisdic-
tion over a foreigner represents discrimination against foreigners, 
we would expect that it would be prohibited. But the Court has 
long permitted states to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in at 
least some circumstances, such as when the defendant is served 
within the state145 or, more recently, when the defendant "purpose-
fully avails" itself of the state.I46 
Yet neither the presence of the defendant in the state nor the 
·purposeful availment of the defendant in any way lessens the sup-
posed discrimination problem. If the state's assertion of jurisdiction 
was intended to or has the effect of unduly burdening a foreigner, 
it is hard to see how that problem is cured by the fact that the 
defendant engaged in purposeful conduct directed at the state. 
Even if a state can assert jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants 
only if they have engaged in conduct directed at the state, that state 
is still imposing the burdens of distant litigation on the out-of-stater 
to the benefit of the in-state plaintiff. In the commerce clause cases, 
the Court has never suggested that by voluntarily doing business in 
1ss See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). 
1s9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). 
140 See generally Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 949, 956-60 (de· 
scribing pro-plaintiff bias of modern choice of law methodology). 
141 See Abrams, supra note 20, at 24. 
142 See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987). 
143 Cf id. at 912-15 (arguing that although some constitutional provisions incorporate 
baselines, others do not). 
144 See id. at 910-12. 
145 See Burnham v. Superior Court, IIO S. Ct. 2105, 2II0-13 (1990) (Scalia, J.). 
146 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudcwicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. 
Denc)da, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). · 
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or with a state, an out-of-state business "agreed" to the special 
burdens imposed on it147 and therefore cannot raise a challenge to 
those burdens. 148 
C. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises: Combining 
Personal jurisdiction with the Commerce Clause 
The commentators are not alone in linking personal jurisdic-
tion with commerce clause-related concerns. The Supreme Court 
in the recent case of Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises149 
suggested that it might be interested in such an approach. 
In Bendix, an Ohio statute suspended its statute of limitations 
for all claims against entities that were not within the state and had 
not designated an agent for service of process.150 Thus, in order 
for a foreign corporation to take advantage of the Ohio statute of 
limitations, it had to appoint an agent for service of process and 
subject itself to general jurisdiction in Ohio.151 
Having assumed that the coerced appointment of an agent was 
an effective waiver of any minimum contacts requirement, the Ben-
dix Court then considered the impact of this waiver on interstate 
commerce.152 In striking down the statute, the Court did not in-
147 Brilmayer, How Contac~ Count, supra note 23, at 96. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York 
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986). In addition to suggesting that the defendant's 
consent eliminates any concern about discrimination, Brilmayer also argues that the require-
ment of purposeful contacts assures that the consumers in a high cost forum will bear the 
costs associated with that forum's expensive legal system. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra 
note 23, at 94-96. As I have argued elsewhere, this is true only if price discrimination is 
possible. See Perdue, supra note 19, at 515 n.207. 
148 For example, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the Court struck 
down a North Carolina statute prohibiting the sale of apples in closed containers that 
displayed a grade other than the applicable U.S. Grade. 432 U.S. 333, 335, 352-53 (1977). 
The Court found that the statute deprived Washington State apple producers of a competitive 
advantage gained by their local-grading system. I d. at 352. The Court nowhere suggests that 
because Washington producers voluntarily sold their apples in North Carolina this legitimized 
the burdensome statute. 
149 486 u.s. 888 (1988). 
150 Id. at 889. 
151 Id. at 892. 
152 I d. at 891-92. Interestingly, the Court seemed to assume that a corporation's "con-
sent" to jurisdiction, given in exchange for the right to rely on Ohio law, was completely 
valid and effective. See id. at 892-93. Although consistent with a 1917 case, see Pennsylvania 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917}, it is nonetheless 
somewhat surprising that none of the Justices seemed troubled by this extorted waiver of a 
constitutional right. See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893-94. Concern about the validity of such a 
waiver has led some commentators to argue that statutes similar to the Ohio statute violate 
due process. See, e.g, Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 759-60. The Supreme 
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dicate clearly whether the problem was an undue burden on com-
merce or discrimination. The Court announced at the beginning of 
its opinion that it was analyzing the problem as an undue burden 
rather than as discrimination.153 Nonetheless, in explaining why the 
statute constituted an undue burden, the Court pointed to the 
discriminatory nature of the statute, noting that "the Ohio statute 
impose[d] a greater burden on out-of-state companies than it does 
on Ohio companies, subjecting the activities of foreign and domestic 
corporations to inconsistent regulations."154 
Any supposed discrimination in the statute is more apparent 
than real. Although the statute forced out-of-state corporations to 
appoint an in-state agent for service of process, domestic corpora-
tions were already required under Ohio corporate law to have an 
in-state agent for service of process.155 Thus, the statute in question, 
rather than discriminating, served to equalize treatment between 
domestic and foreign corporations. 
The undue burden analysis adopted by the Bendix Court is also 
problematic. The Court asserted without explanation that 
"[r]equiring a foreign corporation ... to defend itself with reference 
Court has never directly addressed the due process issue. See G.D. Searle &: Co. v. Cohn, 455 
U.S. 404, 412 n.7 (1982). The lower courts are split on the issue. Compare In re Mid-Atlantic 
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 125 (4th 
Cir. 1983); Schreider v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1090-91 (D. Kan. 1978), 
rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (lOth Cir. 1979) (finding due process violation) wilh 
Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109-12 (Del. 1988) (finding no due process violation). 
Moreover, a year before Bendix, the Court had struck down a state's conditioning a rebuilding 
permit on the owner's granting a public easement. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). The Court noted that unless the permit condition served the same 
purpose as the development ban, the condition would be "'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" 
/d. at 836-37; see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987). 
See generally Seidman, Rejlecti= on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1988) 
(discussing constitutional issues involved when governments impose conditions on offers they 
are not obligated to extend). 
It is also somewhat surprising that the Court assumed that the mere presence within the 
state of an agent is sufficient to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction. Two years 
after Bendix, in Burnham v. Superior Court, the Court reaffirmed the validity of transient 
jurisdiction. 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2119, 2126 (1990). At the time of Bendix, however, its validity 
was very much an open question. Most commentators had argued that after Shaffer v. Heitner 
transient jurisdiction was no longer valid. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death 
Warrant for the Transient Rule of/nPersonamjurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 68 (1980); Kalo, 
jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam Principles, 
1978 DuKE L.]. 1147, 1191; Vernon, Singlefactor Bases of In Personam jurisdiction-A Specu-
lation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 302-03. 
1ss Bendix, 486 U.S. at 891. 
Is• /d. at 894 (citation omitted). 
155 See OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 1701.07(a) (Baldwin 1986). 
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to all transactions, including those in which it did not have the 
minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, 
is a significant burden."156 As Justice Scalia observed in his concur-
rence, the majority made no attempt to quantify or even describe 
the nature of this burden.15' 
The Bendix Court next considered the benefits of the Ohio 
scheme. The justification for the state statute offered by the majority 
was that "serving foreign corporate defendants may be more ar-
duous than serving domestic corporations or foreign corporations 
with a designated agent for service."158 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that this state interest was "legitimate," at least for equal 
protection and due process purposes,159 it apparently concluded, 
though it never explicitly stated, that this interest was worth less 
then the costs imposed on out-of-state defendants. As Justice Scalia 
noted in his concurrence, this type of balancing is "like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."160 
Although the Court's explicit rationale in Bendix is not satisfac-
tory, another explanation for the Court's conclusion is possible. The 
Court may have perceived Bendix as a case in which Ohio was 
imposing one cost on foreign defendants (the costs of being sub-
jected to general jurisdiction) so as to reduce some other cost to 
156 Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893. 
157 I d. at 895-96 (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, the one case that the majority cites for 
its assertion that this represents a significant burden is inapposite. See id. at 893 (citing Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). The discussion in Asahi to which 
the Bendix Court was apparently referring is a discussion of the particular burden of litigating 
in a foreign country. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. 
15s Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893. 
159 ld. at 894. 
160 Id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Tushnet, supra note 113, at 144-45 (dis-
cussing problems involvc;d with balancing incommensurables). 
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court provides an interesting 
counterpoint to Bendix. In Burnham, the Court held that a state may constitutionally exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the presence of the defendant within 
the state and regardless of whether his presence is related at all to the cause of action. 110 
S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (1990) (Scalia, J.); id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2126 
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Stevens,]., concurring). Although there were only plurality 
opinions, four and possibly five justices accepted Justice Brennan's assertion that "[t]he 
potential burdens on a transient defendant are slight." Id. at 2125 (Brennan,]., concurring). 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined Brennan's opinion. Justice Stevens, con-
curring in the judgment, expressed his agreement with "the considerations of fairness iden-
tified by Justice Brennan." Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Burnham was not 
argued as a commerce clause case, the bold assertion that transient jurisdiction imposes few 
burdens stands in striking contrast to the equally bold assertion in Bendix that jurisdiction 
was a significant burden. This seeming contradiction reinforces the perception that Bendix 
was not a case of unreasonable burdens. 
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plaintiffs (the costs of out-of-state service of process). Fundamen-
tally, the problem seems to be that the state's solution is far broader 
than necessary to cure the problem. If the problem is the cost of 
out-of-state service of process, then the easy solution would be to 
require appointment of an agent for service of process, while also 
providing that the presence of an agent does not constitute a waiver 
of the minimum contacts requirements. 161 Thus, the fundamental 
problem with the Ohio statute may have been that the burdens it 
imposed were not sufficiently connected to its purpose and it was 
therefore irrational.t62 
If the real problem in Bendix was that the statute was irrational, 
then that case does not illuminate what the Court should do when 
a state exerts expansive jurisdiction to prevent plaintiffs from hav-
ing to bear the burdens of distant litigation. In such a case, the 
solution seems closely tailored to the problem. Confronted with the 
reality that someone must bear the costs of litigation in a distant 
forum or in a forum with which they have not or would not other-
wise affiliate themselves, it does not seem irrational for a state to 
choose to put that cost on defendants rather than plaintiffs. 163 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE FoRMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Although the traditional understanding of the problem for 
which personal jurisdiction is the solution is inadequate, there may 
be problems for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. These 
problems do not involve profound or abstract issues of the nature 
of sovereignty or the sources of governmental legitimacy. They are 
much more mundane and reflect the considerations that motivate 
actual litigants to care about personal jurisdiction. 
Litigants do care about personal jurisdiction; indeed, they care 
enough to litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction all the way to 
161 See Cutler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (D.NJ. 1989). 
162 See Tushnet, supra note 113, at 146-47 (discussing how in burden cases, the Supreme 
Court will strike down state regulations when the regulations do little to advance the state 
interest asserted). 
163 Interestingly, in the handful of pre-International Shoe cases in which defendants 
challenged assertions of personal jurisdiction on commerce clause grounds, the Supreme 
Court expressly held that having the plaintiff's residence within the forum was an important 
factor that diminished the likelihood of a commerce clause violation. See, e.g., International 
Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 519-20 (1934); State ex rel. St. Louis B. 
& M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 
312, 316-17 (1923); see also Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 439 F.2d 17, 25-27 (2d 
Cir. 1970) (reconsideration en bane). 
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the United States Supreme Court. They care not because of abstract 
philosophical reasons, but because the place where the litigation is 
conducted has a number of practical consequences: choice oflaw; 164 
convenience or inconvenience for one party; 165 and local bias166 or 
perception that judges or juries in particular locales are more or 
less generous. 167 In short, there are numerous practical reasons why 
choice of forum matters. 
Personal jurisdiction limits the plaintiff's choice of fora. The 
fundamental question is whether there are reasons why the federal 
courts should limit the plaintiff's choice. Although my conclusions 
are still somewhat tentative, I believe that it is possible to justify a 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the sole purpose of which is to limit 
plaintiff's choice of fora. 
The rationale for such a doctrine would derive from three 
m£tior practical reasons why litigants care about choice of forum: 
convenience, 168 bias, 169 and choice of law. 170 All three of these con-
siderations can be conceived of as problems for which the federal 
164 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (forum state may 
constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations). In Keeton v. Hustler Magaz.ine, Inc., the 
plaintiff's choice of New Hampshire as the forum and defendant's objection to that forum 
seems to have been largely a function of New Hampshire's six year statute of limitations. See 
465 U.S. 770,772 n.1 (1984). Likewise, some commentators have noted that the fundamental 
concerns of the parties in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), were choice of law 
questions. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam 
jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 619-23 (1958); Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 
72 HARV. L. REv. 695, 698-700 (1959). 
165 See National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326-27 (1964) (Black, J., 
dissenting); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957); Travelers Health 
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950); Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1325-27. 
166 Although the cases do not involve personal jurisdiction, observers of both the Pete 
Rose suit against the Commissioner of Baseball and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 
(1987), have suggested that local bias may have played a role. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, 
§ 1, at 37, col. 2 (Pete Rose); id., June 30, 1989, at A22, col. 5 (same); NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 
1987, at 2 (Pennz.oil); id., Mar. 16, 1987, at 8 (same). 
167 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). For a discussion of the Union Carbide case, see NAT'L LJ., 
July 20, 1987, at 30; id., Dec. 30, 1985, at S-2; id., Dec. 31, 1984, at 3. 
168 See Gottlieb, supra note 19, at 1321-27 (discussing convenience and why it matters 
to litigants). 
169 See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the Insignificance of Foresight, 
70 YALE L.J. 554, 601 (1961). See also supra notes 166 & 167 for examples of cases where 
choice of forum was influenced by concerns about bias. 
170 See Youngblood, Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law: The Nexus Between World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hayne, 50 ALBANY L. REv. 
39 (1985); see also Brilmayer, General jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 777-78 (noting that "only 
when plaintiffs are able tc::i forum shop for applicable law and not just forum location do 
they choose ridiculously inconvenient or disinterested forums"). 
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courts should supply a solution. As I discuss below, however, I 
believe that the concern that is the most likely basis for any signif-
icant personal jurisdiction limitation is choice of law. 
A. Convenience 
Where litigation involves parties from different states, at least 
one party will suffer the inconvenience of having to litigate away 
from home. Although there may be legitimate reasons for a legis-
lature to favor one side over another with respect to convenience, 171 
there is no reason why the federal courts should mandate a system-
atic preference for one side. 
The one situation in which federal court intervention on the 
grounds of convenience might be appropriate is where a forum is 
so burdensome that a party cannot defend herself. The right to 
have one's day in court is a fundamental component of traditional 
procedural due process. 172 In a few situations, a forum may be so 
burdensome that as a practical matter, a party is deprived of her 
day in court.173 
A personal jurisdiction doctrine based on this concern will likely 
be extremely limited in its effect because it is difficult to structure 
a jurisdictional rule that deals effectively with this problem. One 
could, for example, have a rule that suits can only be prosecuted in 
the defendant's place of residence. Although such a rule would 
virtually eliminate the likelihood that defendants would be unduly 
burdened, it would also mean that some plaintiffs would be denied 
their day in court. A more individualized inquiry would lead to 
uncertainty and make the defense of unreasonable inconvenience 
one that is expensive to raise.174 Thus, although there may be cases 
where it is appropriate for the federal courts to intervene in order 
171 For example, the legislature might wish to encourage or discourage particular types 
of suits. 
172 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental require-
ment of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner."'). 
173 Several commentators have argued that personal jurisdiction doctrine should be 
directed primarily to this problem of inconvenience. See Redish, supra note 18, at 1135; 
Weintraub, supra note 18, at 528; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court juris-
diction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses 
(Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 846 (1981). For an argument that the location of trial 
will rarely interfere with a party's ability to defend her rights, see Borchers, The Death of the 
Constitutional Law of Personal jurisdiction: From Penn oyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. 
DAvis L. REv. 19, 95 (1990). 
174 See Borchers, supra note 173, at 102-03. 
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to ensure that the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to de-
fend herself in court, a personal jurisdiction doctrine designed 
solely for this purpose will be of limited impact. Indeed, if the 
purpose of personal jurisdiction is to deal with these cases of ex-
treme inconvenience, there seems to be little reason to have a sep-
arate personal jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, it could be addressed 
under traditional procedural due process doctrine. 175 
B. Bias 
Parties may also care about the choice of forum because they 
believe a particular forum will be biased in favor of one side. In-
deed, some commentators have suggested that this is the primary 
factor in choosing a forum. 176 If there are no choice of forum 
limitations, then the plaintiff has the unbridled ability to select a 
forum biased in her favor. 
The fact that a plaintiff may be able to choose a forum biased 
in her favor does not mean that the federal courts should intervene 
to prevent this choice. Of course, at some point, a particular forum 
may be so biased and unfair that holding the litigation there violates 
the traditional procedural due process principles.177 As with the 
problem of extreme inconvenience, 178 there would seem to be no 
reason for separate personal jurisdiction doctrine to handle these 
occasional problems concerning the fundamental fairness of the 
adjudicatory process. 
As for the more typical situation, there is simply no reason why 
the federal courts should mandate that the litigation occur in a 
forum likely to prefer one side rather than the other. For example, 
one might have a personal jurisdiction rule that requires that all 
suits be brought in the defendant's home state, or alternatively, that 
prohibits suits being brought in the plaintiff's home state. The 
175 This is essentially the approach that would be used in all federal question cases if 
the proposed changes to F.R.C.P. 4 are adopted. Those changes would provide nation-wide 
service of process in all federal question cases. See COMMITTEE ON RuLES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL 
RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15-16 (1989). The Advisory Committee notes that even with 
nation-wide service of process, a defendant would still be protected by the due process clause 
from having to litigate in a forum that was so inconvenient that the litigation violated "fair 
play and substantial justice." Id. at 31. 
17~ See Morris, supra note 169, at 601. 
177 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 
U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279 (1975). 
11a See supra text accompanying note 175. 
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justification would be that this would prevent plaintiffs from being 
able to sue in the state most likely to be biased in their favor. But 
why should the federal courts prefer defendants over plaintiffs? 
Indeed, if the federal courts were to intervene on grounds of lim-
iting bias, the only justifiable rule would seem to be one that requires 
all suits to be brought in states having absolutely nothing to do with 
the controversy or either party, because those states are the most 
likely to be neutral. 
There is an alternative justification for personal jurisdiction 
that is related to the question of bias. It focuses not on the forum 
selected, but on the process of selection. The argument would be 
that it is unfair for plaintiffs to have unbridled ability to choose any 
forum. 179 Our adversarial system is premised on the idea that the 
two litigants should be in relatively equal positions. 180 Thus, for 
example, a system that allowed the plaintiff to designate the judge, 
with no input from the defendant, is so unbalanced in its treatment 
of plaintiffs and defendants that it seems fundamentally unfair. 181 
On the other hand, a more balanced and fair judge selection system 
might be one that permitted the defendant to designate several 
judges and then permitted the plaintiff to choose a forum among 
that list. 
Personal jurisdiction could be conceived of as a way of making 
the process of selecting the forum somewhat more balanced and 
fair by limiting the pool of places from which a plaintiff could pick. 
The question remains, however, as to why the federal courts should 
take it upon themselves to do this. 
Although -intervention might be justified under the due 
process182 or equal protection clauses, 183 I think a more promising 
source of authority would be the full faith and credit clause of the 
United States Constitution. 184 The Supreme Court has interpreted 
( 
179 See Gottlieb, suprc; pote H(, at 1327 (observing that plaintiffs, unlike defendants, have 
the time to consider wh'ere to file suit). 
180 See Mashaw, The Sup;-eme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 52 
(I976). 
181 See Stein, supra note I9, at 759. 
182 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I; see Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. 
L. REv. 579, 588 (1984). 
183 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ I; see Leubsdorf, supra note I82, at 588-90. 
184 U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1. Professor Trangsrud has similarly argued that the federal 
standard for federal jurisdiction derives from the Full Faith and Credit Act. See Trangsrud, 
supra note 23, at 858. He observes, and I agree, that if there were no limit on state jurisdic· 
tiona) authority, states might expand their jurisdictional reach. See id. at 863. I also agree 
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the full faith and credit clause and its implementing legislation 185 
to require that a judgment from one state be given conclusive effect 
in all other states. 186 
Although commentators have questioned the correctness of this 
interpretation, 187 it remains embedded in our law. If this interpre-
tation were extended to mean that all judgments must be enforced, 
at least all judgments that were valid in the rendering forum, this 
would have the effect of expanding plaintiffs' choices of forum over 
the choices that would otherwise exist. In a system in which states 
are not required to and do not always enforce judgments of other 
that such an expansion would not be restrained if jurisdiction were judged only by the law 
of the rendering jurisdiction and that allowing the enforcing state to apply its law would be 
unwise. However, as discussed below, I do not agree that a federal standard is necessary to 
prevent what Trangsrud calls "exorbitant" exercises of jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction by 
states that are insufficiently connected to the defendant. 
The core of his argument about federal common law is the assertion that "[i)t is most 
unlikely that the Framers or the First Congress intended that there be no check on the 
assertion of exorbitant theories of jurisdiction by particular states." See id. at 863. There are 
several problems with this argument. First, he cites no evidence that anyone actually perceived 
"exorbitant" jurisdiction to be a problem and he even notes the "dissatisfaction with unrea-
sonable claims of jurisdiction over noncitizens seems to have played little role in the disaf-
fection many came to feel for the structure created by the Articles [of Confederation]." I d. 
at 858 (footnote omitted). Moreover, it is not clear that there was a consensus about what 
would constitute exorbitant jurisdiction. For example, Trangsrud cites Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 
Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786), and Phelps v. Holker, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 261 (1788), as examples of 
situations in which one state unreasonably asserted jurisdiction and another state refused to 
enforce the judgment. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 858 & n.50. But these cases also 
demonstrate disagreement about what constituted reasonable exercises of jurisdiction because 
the rendering states in those cases presumably considered their conduct completely legitimate. 
Finally, even if the Framers thought it important that the federal government limit state 
power to assert "exorbitant" jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that they envisioned 
direct limits on state jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the Framers may have relied on the 
privileges and immunities clause and diversity jurisdiction to solve the problem of "exorbi-
tant" jurisdiction. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
In contrast to Transgrud, I am arguing for federal jurisdictional standards not because 
it is inherently unreasonable for a state unconnected to the litigation to hear the case. Instead, 
I argue that a process which gives plaintiffs complete and unfettered control over choice of 
forum is unfair. 
185 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 
122 (1790)). 
186 See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484-85 (1813). It is not clear whether 
this holding rests on an interpretation of the constitutional provision or of the implementary 
legislation. See Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 568-70 (1981). 
187 As Professor Maltz has observed, "the unity of the nation will not necessarily be 
threatened if state A is allowed to render and enforce a judgment within its own borders, 
but state B is not required to respect that judgment." Maltz, supra note 135, at 763; see also 
Whitten, supra note 186, at 567. 
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states, a plaintiff's forum options are likely, as a practical matter, to 
be somewhat constrained. Under such a system, the plaintiff would 
consider the fora in which enforcement would likely be sought and 
then would bring the original law suit only in a forum where the 
likely enforcing fora would respect the resulting judgment.188 A 
requirement that all sister-state judgments be enforced would have 
significantly changed the situation. One might argue that such a 
change was the intended effect of the full faith and credit clause. 189 
There is little reason to believe, however, that the framers intended 
the delphic words "full faith and credit" to have that effect.190 The 
purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to guard against "the 
disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence,"191 but 
this purpose does not depend on plaintiffs having unlimited choices 
of forum. 
One might, of course, accept that limiting plaintiffs' choices of 
fora is sensible and consistent with the full faith and credit clause, 
yet also argue that such a step is for Congress, not the courts. 
Indeed, Article IV explicitly gives Congress the task of implement-
ing the full faith and credit clause. Congress has in fact passed 
implementing legislation, but that legislation does not explicitly ad-
dress personal jurisdiction.192 Thus, the Court must decide whether 
the full faith and credit clause requires that all judgments be en-
forced, and includes no requirement concerning enforcement of 
188 This was in fact precisely the situation that existed in the American colonies before 
the Revolution. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 854-55. 
189 Such a holding would not be inconsistent with the long accepted principle that a 
state need only give effect to a judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction. See Jackson, 
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1945); 
Trangsrud, supra note 35, at 862-63. The enforcing state could rely entirely on the law of 
the rendering state to determine whether there was jurisdiction. However, once a state knew 
that any judgments valid under its own law would be enforced, it might expand its courts' 
jurisdiction and thereby expand plaintiffs' forum options. 
190 The clause generated little debate in the ratification process. See Sumner, The Full· 
Faith-and-Credit-Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REv. 224, 230 (1955). The clause 
generated only brief mention in The Federalist Papers. Madison simply observes that the 
provision of the clause giving power to Congress was a "valuable improvement" over the full 
faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation because "[t]he meaning of the latter 
is extremely indeterminate and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it 
will bear." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a history 
of the full faith and credit clause and implementing legislation, sec Nadclmann, Full Faith 
and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33, 34-62 (1957); Sumner, supra, at 
225-41; and Whitten, supra note 186, at 542-70. For a discussion of the purposes of the full 
faith and credit clause, see Sumner, supra, at 241-49. 
191 Jackson, supra note 189, at 17; accord Martin, Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law, 61 
CoRNELL L. REv. 185, 193-94 (1976). 
192 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988). 
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judgments, or something in between. Assuming that the full faith 
and credit clause is not absolute, some entity mus_t delineate rules 
for determining when enforcement is required. In the absence of 
congressional specification, it is appropriate for the federal courts 
to elaborate the specifications. 193 These court-made rules can be 
conceived of as a kind of "dormant" full and credit clause doctrine 
or as federal common law194 made pursuant to the full faith and 
credit statute. 195 
Assuming the authority for federal intervention exists, what 
should the personal jurisdiction rules look like? Personal jurisdiction 
could be conceived of as a variation of the previously described 
judge-selecting scheme. By her conduct, the defendant chooses one 
or more places where the litigation can be brought and the plaintiff 
then gets to choose from among that list. The difficulty is that for 
the reasons discussed earlier, 196 the defendant is unlikely to have 
chosen anything. The defendant has not chosen the pool of possible 
fora; the federal court's jurisdiction doctrine has. The question then 
becomes whether there is any reason why some states should be on 
the list of possible fora and not other states. Put differently, if the 
goal is simply to limit the pool of possible fora from which a plaintiff 
can pick, why not adopt some completely arbitrary rule such as the 
plaintiff can sue in any state that begins with the same letter as the 
defendant's last name? 
The reason such an arbitrary rule is not appropriate is that it 
does not accommqdate legitimate state interests. 197 Any federal rule 
limiting where a plaintiff can sue is a federal intrusion on state 
19s Professor Sumner has noted: 
As a practical matter the full faith and credit demanded by the Constitution is 
that which the Supreme Court specifies. There is nothing whatsoever in the 
history of the clause showing that this was the design of the framers. But, since 
the clause is self-executing . . . and since Congress has failed to carry out its 
task, there is little more that can be done. 
Sumner, supra note 190, at 241. 
19-1 See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) 
(holding that the jurisdictional provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, regulating labor unions, 
was an invitation to the federal courts to fashion federal common law in the labor area). 
195 See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court 
jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 69, 94 (1984). Another option to federal court-made rules 
would be to permit the enforcing state to apply its own standards of validity. However, this 
would sacrifice uniformity, see Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 864-65, something that was a 
concern of the full faith and credit clause, see Sumner, supra note 190, at 246. 
196 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
197 For arguments concerning the need for judicial restraint in the "dormant" commerce 
clause, see Redish & Nugent, The Donnant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of 
Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 592-99; Tushnet, supra note 113, at 150-56. 
568 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:529 
power. States have significant and legitimate reasons for providing 
a forum and, as a matter of federalism, any federal limit on choice 
of forum should accommodate these reasons. 198 
There are two categories of states that have legitimate interests 
in providing a forum. The first category is states in which any 
significant events, omissions or effects occurred. A state has a legit-
imate regulatory interest in providing a forum where it is the locus 
of the liability-producing conduct. 199 But a state would seem also to 
have a legitimate interest in providing a forum whenever it is the 
place of injury. 200 Injuries have ramifications beyond the people 
immediately affected. In World-Wide Volkswagen, for example, the 
plaintiff's car blew up on an Oklahoma road.201 Such an accident 
may well threaten the safety of passers-by and rescue workers as 
well as interfere with traffic.202 Local residents have a legitimate 
interest in knowing the cause of such an accident and likewise have 
an interest in providing a forum for disputes arising out of the 
accident. 203 
198 Professor Smit has set forth numerous reasons why a state might be interested in 
providing a forum: 
The State may be interested in creating a forum for its own litigants. It may be 
interested in creating a local forum so that its Jaws can be properly applied. It 
may be interested in controlling the actions of its nationals. It may be interested 
in creating a forum that is convenient for resident witnesses. It may have an 
interest in efficient administration of justice. And it may be interested in creating 
a local forum for the adjudication of disputes that have an impact on the 
economic and social life of the State. 
Smit, supra note I36, at 35I-52 (footnotes omitted). I think that nearly all of these interests 
would be accommodated under my proposed rule. 
199 See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86. 
200 The Brussels Convention adopts a similar approach. The Brussels Convention on juris-
diction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 3, no. 3, I5 O.J. 
EuR. CoMM. (No. L 299) 32 (I972) (entered into force Feb. I, I973) [hereinafter Brussels 
Convention]. It provides that tort suits may be brought in the place of the "harmful event." 
"Harmful event" has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice to include both the 
place of the events giving rise to liability and the place where damage occurs. See Bier v. 
Mines de Potasse D'Aisace S.A. [I976-8] E.C.R. I736, I743 (European Court of Justice 
I976), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAws 6I2 (I986). 
201 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (I980). 
202 Kay Robinson and her two children, the plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen, were in 
fact rescued from their burning car by two local residents. Tulsa World, Sept. 23, I977, at 
I, col. I. Other local residents, apparently moved by the plight of the family, established the 
Robinson Family Relief Fund. See Tulsa World, Sept. 24, I977, at DI, col. I. 
203 Professor Brilmayer argues that states should not be permitted to assert personal 
jurisdiction solely on the basis of effects within the state. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, 
supra note 23, at 95-96, I05-07. Her rejection of effects as a basis for jurisdiction, however, 
is based entirely on a commerce clause type argument that this allowance of personal juris· 
diction would allow states to impose costs on other states. See supra notes I22-30 and 
accompanying text for discussion of this argument. 
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I believe that a state also has a significant interest in providing 
a forum whenever either disputant is a citizen of that state.204 States 
may be concerned not only with how disputes are resolved,205 but 
also that disputes are resolved peacefully and expeditiously. 206 A 
state may view the presence of unresolved disputes within its pop-
ulation as a threat to public order and happiness. 2°7 
204 See Maltz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine 
of Transient jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 671, 688 (1988); Weintraub, supra note 18, at 524. 
205 Brilmayer focuses exclusively on whether states have a legitimate regulatory interest 
in the conduct in question. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 23, at 86. Thus, she 
addresses the question of a state's interest in how a dispute is resolved but not a state's 
interest in whether the dispute is resolved. See id. 
206 See Twitchell, supra note 49, at 655 (noting that "[a] state's desire as a sovereign to 
provide an orderly process for the adjudication of disputes is a rational basis for providing 
a forum"). 
207 The nationality of the offender and the victim are accepted bases in international 
law for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. See The Draft Convention on Research in 
International Law of the Harvard Law School, jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 435, 519-21, 573-77 (Supp. 1935). Professor Stein has asserted that "[s]overeignty 
is not a generalized charter to protect a state's domiciliaries around the world," Stein, supra 
note 19, at 743, and the United States has in the past expressed hostility towards a theory of 
"passive personality" under which jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the victim. See 
Note, Extraterritorial jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic 
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 599, 603-06 (1987). Nonetheless, 
in 1986 Congress acted in apparent reliance on the passive personality principle in adopting 
legislation aimed at terrorism that makes it a crime to kill or endanger a United States 
national abroad. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988); Note, supra, at 613-16. Moreover, courts have 
held that the United States has authority to exercise jurisdiction on this basis, at least when 
specifically authorized by statute. See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.D.C. 1988). Finally, as the United 
States' justifications for its invasions of Grenada and the Dominion Republic demonstrate, 
we have at times certainly acted as if we believed that our national sovereignty is a generalized 
charter to protect our domiciliaries around the world. Concerning the invasion of Grenada, 
see N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 1 (quoting Pres. Reagan: "The United States 
objectives are clear-to protect our own citizens .... "); N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, § 1, at 
10, col. 5 (quoting Pres. Reagan: "I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the 
aid of its citizens if their right to life and liberty is threatened."). Concerning the invasion of 
the Dominican Republic, see N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965, at 10, col. 5 (quoting Pres. Johnson: 
"Our forces, American forces, were ordered in immediately to protect American lives."). See 
also Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902-03 (noting that the extradition to the United States of the 
terrorist leader responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the murder of Leon 
Klinghoffer was justified solely on the basis of the citizenship of the victim). 
There is no obvious reason to treat civil cases differently. In fact, commentators have 
noted that a number of other countries recognize the nationality of the litigants as 1egitimate 
bases of asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., de Vries & Lowenfeld,]urisdiction in Personal Actions-
A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IowA L. REv. 306,317 (1959); Rheinstein, The Constitutional 
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 797-99 (1955); Weser, Bases of]udicial]urisdiction 
in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J. CoMP. L. 323, 324-27 (1961). 
The Brussels Convention provides for jurisdiction at the defendant's domicile and, for 
certain classes of plaintiffs, i.e., consumers, policyholders, and support claimants, at the 
plaintiff's domicile. Brussels Convention, supra note 200, art. 2, 11 1 (defendant's domicile); id. 
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In sum, I believe there is a plausible argument that allowing 
plaintiffs an unlimited choice of forum violates the principle that 
litigants should be in relatively equal positions. The full faith and 
credit clause provides a basis for federal court intervention, but any 
such intervention must be sensitive to legitimate state interests in 
providing a forum. 
C. Choice of Law 
A final reason why litigants may care about choice of forum is 
that it may have a significant, if not dispositive, effect on choice of 
law. 208 The Supreme Court has given states wide latitude in the area 
of choice of law209 and with the multitude of choice of law ap-
proaches,210 there may be significant variations in the law that would 
be applied by different fora. 
Numerous commentators have noted the relationship between 
judicial jurisdiction and choice oflaw. 211 Several have proposed that 
the two doctrines should be linked so that if there is jurisdiction 
then the forum can apply its own law212 or if the forum can apply 
its own law, then there is jurisdiction.213 However, most of the 
commentators who have stressed the relationship between jurisdic-
tion and choice of law assume that jurisdiction serves some function 
independent of its effect on choice of law.214 My suggestion here is 
art. 14 (consumers); id. art. 8, ~ 2 (policyholders); id. art. 5, no. 2 (support claimants). See 
generally Juenger, judicial jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A 
Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1195 (1984). 
208 See Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 869, 872 (1981). In some cases, it has been obvious that the plaintiff's choice 
of forum was influenced by choice of law considerations. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 
S. Ct. 1274, 1277-78 (1990); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773 & n.1 
(1984). 
209 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1981) (Brennan, J.); id. 
at 362 (Stevens, J., concurring); R. SEDLER, AcRoss STATE LINES 108 (1989). 
210 See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choices of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521 
(1983). 
211 See, e.g., Hill, Choice of Law and jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 CoLUl\1. L. REv. 
960, 993 (1981); Martin, Personal jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L.REv. 872, 874 
(1980); Peterson, jurisdiction and Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 37, 38-40 (1988); 
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 79-90 (1978); Weinberg, 
The Place of the Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. CoLO. L. 
REv. 67, 97-99 (1988). 
212 See Sedler, judicial jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 
63 IowA L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1978). 
2
" See Silberman, supra note 211, at 88. 
214 See Hay, judicial jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59 U. CoLo. 
L. REv. 9, 9-10, 34 (1988); Maltz, supra note 204, at 700; Peterson, supra note 208, at 884; 
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that personal jurisdiction can be treated as not merely related to 
choice of law, but a doctrine whose sole purpose is to keep cases 
out of states that would not be permitted to apply their own law. 
This argument is of course premised on the view that some 
constitutional limits of choice of law are appropriate. Although I 
have argued in this article that most justifications for limiting judi-
cial jurisdiction do not withstand scrutiny, I do not believe the same 
is true for choice of law. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
analyze this proposition fully, but I would simply note that it is far 
more important to people structuring their conduct to know what 
law will apply than it is to know where they might be sued.215 
Assuming it is appropriate to impose federal limits on choice 
of law, why use jurisdiction to accomplish this? Why not deal with 
choice of law direcdy by permitting any state to be a forum but, 
where necessary, prohibiting it from applying its law? There are 
two reasons why it is appropriate to prohibit a state from hearing 
a case if it is insufficiently connected to be able to apply its own law. 
The first reason derives from legal realism.216 A court that 
"applies" another state's law is in fact applying its own interpretation 
of some other law and thereby applies its law. There is no reason 
why a state that is insufficiently connected to a case to apply its law 
should be allowed to apply its "interpretation" of law.217 
The second reason why it is sensible to limit choice of forum 
so as to limit choice of law stems from the Supreme Court's holding 
in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.218 In Wortman, the Court held that a 
forum may constitutionally apply its own procedures, including its 
statute of limitations. Although some might criticize that decision 
as simply wrong,219 I think it correcdy embodies the concern ap-
Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the 
"Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY LJ. 729, 819 (1981); Rosenberg, Foreword to the Colorado Symposium, 
59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1988); Weinberg, supra note 211, at 103. 
215 As Professor Silberman has aptly observed: "To believe that a defendant's contacts 
with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional 
purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where 
he will be hanged than whether." Silberman, supra note 211, at 88. 
216 See L. BRILMAYER, CoNFLICTS OF LAws: FouNDATIONS AND FuTURE DIRECTIONS 31, 
34-36 (1991); see also Linkletter v. Waliker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1965); Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). 
217 Moreover, where a state that is prohibited from applying its own laws is permitted 
to be the forum and "interpret" the laws of other states, the Supreme Court may then have 
to decide whether the interpretation is so extreme as to violate the constitution. See Sun Oil 
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988). 
218 486 u.s. 717 (1988). 
219 In an article written several years before Wortman, Professor Martin criticized lower 
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parent in the Erie cases220 that what it means to be a forum is to 
have the right to apply your own procedures. Within the federal 
system, the power to create the courts carries with it the authority 
to proscribe the rules of procedure for those courts.221 The Su-
preme Court has held that this power to extend to all matters 
"rationally capable of classification" as procedural.222 Wortman sim-
ply extends that same broad control to states. It is less intrusive on 
states for the federal courts to prohibit a state altogether from 
hearing a case than it is to permit it to hear the case but pick and 
choose among the procedures that states can apply. 
If one treats jurisdiction as the handmaiden of choice of law 
whose function is to implement choice of law concerns, that does 
not necessarily mean that the test for jurisdiction should be identical 
to the test developed in the choice of law area. Jurisdiction is a 
preliminary matter and the standards for jurisdiction should be 
relatively clear and straightforward.223 Personal jurisdiction can be 
treated as simply a first cut at dealing with choice of law problems 
and an admittedly imperfect one. 
With respect to choice of law, the Supreme Court has held that 
a state may apply its laws where it has a "significant contact or 
significant aggregation of contacts" with the claims creating state 
interests. 224 Contacts that the Court has considered relevant in cre-
ating state interests are the connection of the parties to a state225 
and the place where conduct or injuries occurred.226 Therefore, a 
possible test might be one similar to the approach suggested earlier 
in connection with the discussion of bias. 227 
If personal jurisdiction is a tool for implementing choice of law 
doctrine, then the goal of a personal jurisdiction test would be to 
court cases that allowed the forum to apply its statute of limitations in situations similar to 
Wortman. Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in Conflict of Laws, 19 WASHBURN L. 
REv. 405, 415-21 (1980). 
220 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64,92 (1938) (Reed,J., concurring). 
221 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72; Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 
693, 706 & n.77 (1974). 
222 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
225 As Professor Borchers has aptly observed, "[i]t is bad enough to tell the Robinsons 
· and Heitners of the world that their suit cannot be brought in the the most logical and 
sensible forum, it is worse yet to tell them so only after three levels of appellate review, with 
the result flipping back and forth as each new court reviews the case." Borchers, supra note 
173, at 102. 
224 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985). 
225 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-19 (1981). 
226 See Watson v. Employees Liability Assurance Co., 348 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1954). 
227 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. 
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eliminate as possible fora any state that was obviously unconnected 
to the parties or the events. After the case was underway in a forum, 
a more refined choice of law analysis could be made. One might 
still conclude that a forum could not apply its law. But I am not 
proposing that jurisdiction be treated as a complete solution to 
choice of law problems, only that a well-constructed and straight-
forward personal jurisdiction rule can be a useful tool for reducing 
unnecessary choice of law problems. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
A coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction requires a clear 
understanding of the purposes underlying the doctrine. The Su-
preme Court has never clearly articulated these underlying pur-
poses, but the cases hint, and a growing chorus of commentators 
explicitly argue, that personal jurisdiction is best understood as a 
concrete manifestation of the philosophical problem of political 
obligation and legitimacy. This view has led some commentators to 
argue that personal jurisdiction should either explicitly incorporate 
concepts derived from political philosophy or implicitly incorporate 
such concepts by relying on approaches derived from the dormant 
commerce clause. Unfortunately, neither political philosophy nor 
the dormant commerce clause provides an adequate justification for 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that there may be one or more 
problems for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. I have 
focused on practical problems created by a plaintiff having unlim-
ited choices of fora and suggested that some of these may be prob-
lems of sufficient magnitude that it is appropriate to solve them 
through federal court-imposed limitations on choice of forum. I 
have attempted to describe preliminarily what a doctrine centered 
on these problems might look like. My goal is not to detail defini-
tively a new test for jurisdiction but to describe the proper approach 
to formulating such a test. The central premise of my approach is 
that a coherent doctrine is not possible without first identifying the 
problem for which personal jurisdiction is the solution. We either 
have to let the beetle out of the box or stop talking about it.228 
228 If we do not do this, we may find ourselves in the chaos best described by Dr. Seuss. 
T.S. GErSSEL, Fox IN SocKS 54 (1965) ("When beetles fight these battles in a bottle with their 
paddles .... "). 
